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Christopher
McCrudden*
IS THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO ADDRESS
THE PATHOLOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW? A COMMENT ON PATRICK MACKLEM’S
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS†
I aim to provide a critique of Patrick Macklem’s thesis in The Sovereignty of
Human Rights that the function of human rights in international law should be
seen ‘in terms of their capacity to monitor the structure and operation of the interna-
tional legal order . . . requir[ing] the international legal order to attend to patholo-
gies of its own making.’ I suggest an alternative account that seems to me to be more
consistent with much of the practice that he describes, but I rearrange it to provide a
more convincing narrative. The function of human rights in international law
does have the function that Macklem attributes to it, among others, but to claim that
this is the C function of international human rights law is to underestimate the com-
plexity of human rights as well as their true signiﬁcance (at least in my view). An
analysis of international human rights law must take this complexity into account if
a coherent and convincing explanation of the normativity of international human
rights law is to stand any chance of being identiﬁed.
Keywords: sovereignty, human rights, international law, jurisprudence, plu-
ralism
Patrick Macklem’s aim in The Sovereignty of Human Rights is set out
boldly on the ﬁrst page. His aim, he says, is to ‘offer a legal theory of
human rights in international law that deﬁnes their nature and scope.’1
In doing so, the book sets out several steps that lead, argues Macklem, to
an equally bold thesis: that the function of human rights in international
law should be seen ‘in terms of their capacity to monitor the structure
and operation of the international legal order . . . requir[ing] the inter-
national legal order to attend to pathologies of its own making.’2 In this
brief comment on Macklem’s complex and wide-ranging tour de force, I
applaud the ambition of the enterprise, I agree with much of the analy-
sis, but I ultimately disagree with the thesis itself, for reasons that I will
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explain. The function of human rights in international law does have
the function that Macklem attributes to it, among others, but to claim
that this is the principal function of international human rights law is to
underestimate their complexity as well as their true signiﬁcance (at least
in my view).
This article is in three parts. In the ﬁrst, I aim to provide a critique of
Macklem’s thesis. In the second part, I suggest an alternative account,
that seems to me to be more consistent with much of the practice that
he describes but rearranges it to provide a more convincing alternative
narrative. The third part concludes.
I Critique
There are now several sustained attempts by political philosophers to
theorize about the meaning, scope, and justiﬁcation of human rights.
One signiﬁcant difference between these varied philosophical ap-
proaches has to do with methodology: where do we start if we want to
provide a normative account of human rights? One strand of philosophi-
cal theorizing has attempted to provide accounts that begin from the
practice of human rights (practice-dependent theories). There are sev-
eral varieties of such an approach, but one of the most prominent exam-
ples is taken by a group of philosophers who have been identiﬁed as
adopting a ‘political’ approach, an approach particularly associated with
John Rawls,3 Joseph Raz,4 and Charles Beitz,5 among others. In contrast,
other philosophers provide accounts based initially on a priori reasoning
(practice independent). There are also several examples of this
approach, but the most prominent recent exemplars are John Tasioulas6
and James Grifﬁn.7 They are sometimes described as adopting an ‘ortho-
dox’ or ‘moral’ approach.
Macklem’s approach is rooted ﬁrmly in the practice-dependent
approach and partly follows the ‘political’ approach. He contrasts his
approach with what he describes as the ‘moral accounts’ of those such as
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
3 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, rev ed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2001) [Rawls, Law of Peoples].
4 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasiou-
las, eds, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 321
[Raz, ‘Human Rights’].
5 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
6 John Tasioulas, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’ (2012) Current Legal Probs
1 at 22; John Tasioulas, ‘Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention?’
(2009) 4 Philosophy Compass 938.
7 James Grifﬁn, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Tasioulas and Grifﬁn, which he criticizes because ‘human rights in inter-
national law are not those that moral theory generates,’ and moral ac-
counts of human rights ‘are not normative accounts of international
human rights law.’8 Despite the fact that the jurisprudence of human
rights is part of human rights practice in a broad sense, no prominent
practice-dependent philosopher, including those from the ‘political’ tra-
dition, accords any signiﬁcant place to the contemporary jurisprudence
of human rights in their accounts of human rights practice. This seems
to me both puzzling and a signiﬁcant gap in practice-dependent ap-
proaches. Recent philosophical accounts of human rights that purport
to be based on the actual practice of human rights are ﬂawed, therefore,
in so far as they seldom engage in a sustained way with the international
judicial interpretation of human rights guarantees, focusing instead
mainly on the international political practice of human rights (Rawls,9
Raz10), on the constitutional text and the limited judicial practice of one
state (Jürgen Habermas11), on the international treaty texts (Allen Bu-
chanan12), or on historical developments without appreciating the role
of judicial practice in that history (Hans Joas13).
Macklem’s approach, on the contrary, rightly integrates the jurispru-
dence of human rights ﬁrmly within the practice of human rights. The
signiﬁcance of this move should not be underestimated. It poses, I sug-
gest, a major challenge to current ‘political’ approaches and marks one
signiﬁcant way in which Macklem begins to distance himself from cur-
rent ‘political’ approaches. I agree, therefore, with Macklem’s implicit
critique of previous attempts in philosophy and political theory to
engage with the meaning, scope, and justiﬁcation of human rights. I also
agree that, if we are to take a practice-dependent approach to the role of
international human rights law, we need to situate it in the practice of
international law more broadly.
However, while I agree that one cannot understand the role of inter-
national human rights law without so situating it, I equally do not think
one can understand international human rights law without situating it
within human rights law more broadly, including transnational and
domestic human rights law. I suggest, therefore, that Macklem does not
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
8 Macklem, Sovereignty, supra note 1 at 13 (emphasis added).
9 Rawls, Law of Peoples, supra note 3.
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Human Rights’ (2010) 41:4 Metaphilosophy 464.
12 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
[Buchanan, Heart of Human Rights].
13 Hans Joas, The Sacredness of the Person (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
2013).
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take his own preferred approach seriously enough in this regard and
that if we are interested in providing an account of the role of interna-
tional human rights law, we should integrate more fully what is occurring
at the national level in human rights law into the international human
rights narrative. I want to make a case, therefore, for the inclusion of the
activities of judicial institutions (national and international) in accounts
of human rights that purport to grow from human rights practice.
It is true that the importance of the local and the domestic in fully
understanding the role and function of international human rights is
mentioned, albeit brieﬂy, early in the ﬁrst chapter,14 but, thereafter, it is
signiﬁcantly downplayed. This is unfortunate, I think, because it misses
the signiﬁcance of Karen Knop’s observation,15 quoted by Macklem,16
which suggests that the role (and perhaps even the meaning) of interna-
tional human rights may diverge signiﬁcantly at the national level. So,
too, it misses the signiﬁcance of Anne Peters’s insight, also cited by
Macklem, that ‘international and domestic legal orders work together to
ensure respect for human rights.’17 This is the area of scholarship that is
now termed ‘comparative international law,’ an approach that needs to
be more fully integrated into an explanation of the type that Macklem is
attempting.
For example, in a recently published article in the American Journal of
International Law concerning the domestic interpretation of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), I argued that the observable patterns of references to
CEDAW in national level courts may result, to a signiﬁcant degree, from
the combination of four elements that, taken together, are unique to
international human rights law in this setting: that it is international law;
that it concerns human rights; that it is law; and that it is being applied
domestically.18 The ﬁrst three elements combined offer domestic courts
a set of norms that is consensus based (‘international’) and purportedly
universal (‘human rights’), which courts and legal advocates are able to
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
14 Macklem, Sovereignty, supra note 1 at 5.
15 The relation between domestic and national law now involves “a process of translation
from international to national”, producing “new meanings.” Karen Knop, ‘Here and
There: International Law in Domestic Courts’ 32 NYU J Intl L & Pol (2000) 501 at
506.
16 Ibid at 5.
17 Ibid at 38 (this is Macklem’s description of Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the Λ and Ω of
Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 EJIL 513).
18 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights
Treaties? A Comparative International Law Analysis of CEDAW’ (2015) 109:3 AJIL
534. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 49.
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draw on (‘law’), in order to help address domestic concerns or escape
from otherwise troublesome ‘domestic’ constraints.
If true, this seems a signiﬁcant challenge to Macklem’s thesis. In par-
ticular, it seems to challenge his argument that international human
rights ‘speak to injustices produced by the ﬁeld [that is, international
law] itself, not to abstract wrongs such as those contemplated by moral
conceptions of human rights.’19 Leaving aside, for the moment, Mack-
lem’s point about ‘abstract wrongs’ and ‘moral conceptions,’ and focus-
ing only on the scope of the ﬁeld, this statement appears to be correct
only if ‘the ﬁeld’ is not broadened (as I suggest it should be) to locate
international law within a broader legal frame. My argument is not
intended to suggest, however, that international law operating at the
international level does not exist as a distinct ﬁeld, only that interna-
tional human rights law appears to play a more complex role vis-à-vis
domestic law, and vice versa, than Macklem seems to suppose – or, at
least, than he seems to suppose on some occasions. On other occasions,
he accepts that the fact that because ‘international law aims to regulate
national legal orders does not necessarily mean that national legal or-
ders accept how they are conceptualized in international law,’ but this
insight does not seem to be followed through in terms of analyzing the
functions that international human rights law now plays.20
The previous paragraph hints at another problem with Macklem’s
approach. A critical dimension of any explanation of human rights legal
practice must be that human rights law is not static, that it may change
radically over time, and that it may vary considerably between jurisdic-
tions. As a result, a broader understanding of what constitutes relevant
practice (including national judicial practice, for example) would also
require practice-dependent theories to confront the signiﬁcant degree
of substantive pluralism in our understandings of human rights as cur-
rently interpreted. I have suggested in a recent book that
[h]uman rights law appears to lack an uncontested structure, content, method
or consistent theoretical underpinning across jurisdictions. This legal pluralism
appears to be the result of claims involving competing and, sometimes, incom-
patible substantive values, each supported by credible human rights sources and
interpretations. Human rights, as interpreted by the courts, function in appar-
ently contradictory ways: they look forward, but also backward; they appeal to
both communitarian and individualistic values; they juggle both the particular
and the universal; they struggle between continuity and change; they empower
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
19 Macklem, Sovereignty, supra note 1 at 40.
20 Ibid at 44.
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the state, and they challenge its power. Courts seem to be constantly caught in
these opposing forces.21
Macklem does not seem to me to fully face up to the challenge that
this pluralism poses for his thesis. He argues that ‘international law . . .
structures global politics by a binary opposition between legality and ille-
gality, conferring legal authority on some claims of economic and politi-
cal power and rejecting others as international illegalities.’22 But, surely,
this is exactly what international human rights usually fails to do in prac-
tice, not least because there is no once-and-for-all, ﬁnal authoritative
decision maker on the legal issues involved. Any legal decision about a
contested area of human rights is often quite provisional and subject to
varying degrees of continuing legal debate and challenge. Macklem, of
course, recognizes this at a signiﬁcant point in chapter 3, where he
speaks of the ‘deep contestation that arise[s] in the context of particular
disputes that frame them in continually new and unpredictable ways’23
and recognizes that the content of human rights ‘is constantly open to
contestation,’ but the full implications of this insight are left unexplored
in the case studies that form the second half of the book.24
A broader understanding of that practice would take more seriously
the institutional context in which human rights operate. For example,
philosophical approaches require a deeper engagement with the fact
that so many different institutions are so heavily involved. This poses a
challenge, in particular, to those seeking to project a view of human
rights as laying down authoritative standards. More often, I will suggest
below, international human rights provide the forum and the language
for continuing debate and argument, but little closure. I agree whole-
heartedly, therefore, with Macklem’s description of ‘human rights as
legal sites of moral and political contestation over fundamental ques-
tions about the structure and operation of international law’ itself25 and
that these debates are cast ‘in distinctively legal terms,’26 but I do not
think that addressing the pathologies of international law is primarily
the distinct function(s) of international human rights law.
Although there are hints in the ﬁrst quotation in the previous para-
graph (‘human rights as legal sites of moral and political contestation’)
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
21 Christopher McCrudden, ‘The Pluralism of Human Rights Adjudication’ in Liora La-
zarus, Christopher McCrudden & Nigel Bowles, eds, Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judi-
cial Engagement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 3.
22 Macklem, Sovereignty, supra note 1 at 24.
23 Ibid at 65.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid at 2.
26 Ibid at 26.
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that something like the moral conception of human rights must play a
role, what is missing from Macklem’s account, I suggest, is a consistent,
thick, and convincing account of the unique normativity of human rights
law. There is little in the argument that Macklem advances that seems to
distinguish clearly international human rights law from other parts of
international law. For example, much of international economic law (in-
cluding international trade, investment, and public procurement law)
could be usefully categorized as having the same or very similar func-
tional characteristics as Macklem sees international human rights law as
possessing (‘monitor[ing] the structure and operation of the interna-
tional legal order . . . requir[ing] the international legal order to attend
to pathologies of its own making’27).
What appears to be missing is any convincing account of the normativ-
ity of international human rights that distinguishes it, for example, from
international trade law. Where this is attempted, the results are both
vague and (potentially, at least) inconsistent. There is, for example, a
persistent identiﬁcation of the role of international human rights as ad-
dressing ‘pathologies’ in the system of international law itself, but what
are the pathologies that international human rights in particular seeks
to address?
The most common term that Macklem uses to describe the pathology
to be addressed is ‘injustice,’ which is used (in somewhat different ways)
over seventy times throughout the book. At other times, however, the
‘pathology’ to be addressed seems to be expressed in rather different
terms. In his important ﬁrst chapter, he recognizes that ‘[p]reventing a
State from threatening essential features of what it means to be human . . . is
. . . part of the real normative terrain of international human rights law,’
although he considers it ‘but a small part.’28 In the second chapter,
international human rights is deﬁned as consisting of ‘instruments that
seek to regulate the relationship between the individual and the State in
order to protect interests that we all share as humans.’29 Do all of these itali-
cized phrases mean the same thing? I do not think so.
In any event, it does not seem to matter to Macklem because the func-
tion of human rights is rather different in his view. It is not to advance
‘any universal or moral attributes’; instead, it ‘is to address the fact that
international law authorizes States to exercise sovereign power in ways
that threaten the interests that such rights seek to protect [whatever they
are].’30 But this brings us back to what the difference is between
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
27 Ibid at 1.
28 Ibid at 23 (emphasis added).
29 Ibid at 35 (emphasis added).
30 Ibid at 65.
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international trade law and human rights since the former could equally
well be described in these terms.
As should be clear by now, I broadly agree with Macklem’s general strat-
egy of distinguishing practice-dependent and practice-independent ap-
proaches, but where we seem to differ is that I am attracted by this
distinction only as an initial heuristic device. In practice, the sharp distinc-
tion he seeks to draw between these two approaches is overdrawn. Con-
trary both to Macklem and to current practice-dependent philosophical
approaches, and somewhat paradoxically, more attention to actual legal
practice would question whether ‘practice-dependent’ approaches should
be quite as dismissive of ‘orthodox’ or ‘moral’ approaches as they are.
Although Macklem recognizes that the international human rights norms
‘inescapably possess normative dimensions,’ he argues that ‘forays into
moral theory to determine their normative content remain tethered to
the international legal order.’31
But this does not seem to me to reﬂect international legal practice.
Quite often, I suggest, it is tethered to ‘orthodox’ understandings of
human rights, hence the popularity of discourse drawing on concepts
such as human dignity. It is unconvincing to argue that ‘human dignity’
is ‘tethered to the international legal order,’ given that its purpose is pre-
cisely not to tether it to any particular institutional manifestation,
national or international. It claims, after all, to be a universal principle. I
agree that the normativity of concepts such as human dignity ‘is one that
is internal . . . to international law,’ in Macklem’s words, but it is also
‘external’ to international law, including in national law. In other words,
Macklem’s practice-dependent approach is incomplete as it stands at the
moment. A preferable approach is one reﬁned by the inclusion of dis-
tinctively ‘orthodox’ elements, in particular, the idea that human rights
derive their normative power from being seen as in pursuit of human
dignity. There are something like ten references at critical points in the
book to this concept,32 yet there is little attempt to integrate it into his
normative account. The moral conception of human rights has to do
some of the heavy lifting, but how much or in what way is left largely un-
explored.
So far as I am aware, neither international human rights courts, tribu-
nals, or committees, nor domestic human rights courts, tribunals, or
committees, mention a Macklem-type rationale in justifying their deci-
sions. What are we to make of this omission? Interestingly, I think, the
question raises a deeper issue as to the nature of the explanation of
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
31 Ibid at 22.
32 Ibid at 3, 60, 66, 67, 70, 75, 77, 84, 146, 200.
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practice that Macklem provides. If, as sometimes seems to be the case,
he purports to take an internal point of view, à la H.L.A. Hart, then a sig-
niﬁcant problem with Macklem’s thesis is that one might have expected,
from an internal account explicitly based on practice, that those inter-
preting international human rights standards would themselves, at least
some of the time, advert to the kind of explanation he provides as the
basis for their decision in any particular case. But if, as also often seems
to be the case, he is actually adopting a more external approach, as his
earlier critical legal studies stance would require, then perhaps it is less
surprising that his explanation would not ﬁgure in legal argument. But
this tension – is it an internal or an external account? – is nowhere re-
solved.
II An alternative approach
The question is what, if anything, distinguishes international human
rights law from the rest of international law and also provides the glue
that holds the ever-increasing material scope of speciﬁc human rights
(freedom of religion, freedom of expression, the right to strike, the right
to clean water, and a right to a basic minimum income, for example)
together as a coherent, consistent whole? Is an alternative normative
theory to Macklem’s possible, one that is broadly consistent with much
of his account of practice but also addresses the problems in his account
that I have raised in the previous part of this article? I think so, and my
aim in the remainder of this article is to advance this alternative theory,
provisionally and tentatively.
My starting point looks strikingly Hartian, but it is the Hart of Punish-
ment and Responsibility33 rather than the Hart of The Concept of Law,34 or
the Hart of ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’35 Hart distinguishes at least
two justiﬁcatory issues in constructing a normative theory of punish-
ment. First, what is the ‘general justifying aim’ of the system? What justi-
ﬁes the creation and maintenance of such a system – what good can it
achieve, what duty can it fulﬁl, what moral demand can it satisfy? Second,
he distinguishes the methods adopted to further this system, including
who may properly be punished and how the appropriate amount of pun-
ishment should be determined. We need to distinguish, in other words,
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
33 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2d ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
34 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, edited by Penny Bulloch & Joseph Raz (with an intro-
duction and notes by Leslie Green), 3d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
35 HLA Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64:2 Philosophical Review 175.
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the general justifying aim of the system, from how we pursue that aim –
crudely, a means/end distinction. Hart argues that we ﬁnd that quite dif-
ferent (and even, potentially, conﬂicting) values are relevant to these dif-
ferent issues about punishment and that any complete normative
account of punishment will have to ﬁnd a place for these differing values
– in order to help us ﬁnd some way of deciding between them when they
conﬂict.
I think that this general strategy is also useful in analyzing the human
rights ‘system’ and the place of human dignity in it. Incidentally, Allen
Buchanan’s recent book adopts a similar starting point.36 We need to
modify the Hartian strategy in one major respect, however. I do not
assume, as I think Hart (and perhaps also Macklem) sometimes seems
to, that there must be a set of justiﬁcations there to be identiﬁed. Norma-
tive theorists must be open to the possibility that the practice cannot be
justiﬁed, if there is no coherent set of moral justiﬁcations in the human
rights context. I believe, in fact, that a set of normative justiﬁcations do
exist, but we cannot simply assume that they must exist.
My suggestion is that the general justifying aim of human rights, iden-
tiﬁed from the practice of human rights, is the pursuit of human dignity,
in the sense that each human person, qua human person, possesses an
intrinsic worth that should be respected. I will call this the ontological
claim. There is much in Macklem’s own analysis that seems to me to sup-
port this claim, but, more signiﬁcantly, this is the concept that above all
others (certainly above ‘justice’) is most commonly found in all interna-
tional human rights instruments and, increasingly, in judicial practice
and that appears to be regarded as foundational to human rights, as a
whole. It is here that I depart most signiﬁcantly from Macklem’s analysis,
particularly when he states baldly: ‘Whether civil and political rights, and
the interests that underlie them, relate to essential features of what it
means to be human and therefore exemplify moral conceptions of
human rights thus has little to do with their function in international
law.’37
However, although mine is a foundationalist claim, it is a weak founda-
tionalist claim. In particular, we should not infer that the idea of human
dignity instantiates any particular understanding of what the value of the
human person consists of. It is not necessarily an understanding of dig-
nity as autonomy, or of equality, or of communitarianism. In particular,
it is not necessarily a liberal agenda. It is simply a claim that a human
person has a moral worth as a person. I suggested in an earlier article
This ahead of print version may differ slightly from the ﬁnal published version.
36 Buchanan, Heart of Human Rights, supra note 12.
37 Macklem, Sovereignty, supra note 1 at 65; see generally at 64–7.
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that two elements, also rooted in the practice that Macklem describes
and deriving from the claim to human dignity, have developed which
limit the methods of pursuing this aim.38 These also are weak claims.
First, some forms of conduct between persons are inconsistent with
respect for this intrinsic worth (the relational claim). Second, the state
exists for the individual, not vice versa (the limited state claim). The dif-
ferent understandings of each of these elements of the concept of
human dignity indicate that different conceptions of human dignity,
and different ways of pursuing it, are identiﬁable. The fault lines lie in
disagreement as to what the intrinsic worth of persons consists in, what
forms of treatment are inconsistent with that worth, and what the impli-
cations are for the role of the state.
Weak though it is, however, the general justifying aim I have identiﬁed
also provides a moral foundation for the system of human rights as a
whole. Here is where another difference with Macklem emerges. Rather
surprisingly, Macklem considers that only political and civil rights may
be underpinned by the concept of human dignity, not social and eco-
nomic rights, because the latter ‘purport to provide individuals with
access to resources.’39 But this approach seems to have little to do with
the actual practice of human rights, where human dignity is often drawn
on as the basis for social and economic rights, if not more than for civil
and political rights.
Note that I distinguish between human dignity and human rights.
Human rights are to be seen as one strategy by which human dignity is
pursued. It is not the only way in which it is pursued. The human rights
system, then, consists of a set of norms that are institutionalized in
related, but different, sets of practices: international, diplomatic, legal,
constitutional, moral, revolutionary, and so on. In this, my approach is
clearly inﬂuenced by Rawls in the sense that human rights do not just
exist out there ﬂoating free but, rather, they have to be institutionalized
to make them ‘real.’ Where I differ from Rawls (and in a different way
from Macklem) is that I do not limit the institutionalization of human
rights to the narrow range of institutions that they appear to.
Each of these elements of human rights practice has its own normative
foundation in play that means that different rights aiming to further
human dignity will (perhaps even should) result. There is, for example,
a set of legal institutional considerations and constraints that mean that
not all legal human rights are also moral human rights, and vice versa.
Dignity also provides a critique of the human rights system. It is perfectly
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compatible with my approach – indeed my approach requires – that
each area of human rights practice can, and should, be scrutinized for
whether it does not adequately pursue human dignity. It provides, there-
fore, a constraint on what human rights can consist of in each of these
areas of practice, but, again, it is a weak constraint. It would reject an at-
tempted justiﬁcation of an approach to the pursuit of human rights that
simply handed all power over to an unconstrained state, but, beyond
that, it is deeply contested as to what is required.
In practice, these critiques are both internal and external (using these
terms in a somewhat difference sense than before) to these areas of prac-
tice. Each develops over time particular ways of understanding the gen-
eral justifying aim and, therefore, provides the opportunity for an
immanent critique of the understanding of human rights within that
area. But the fact that there are different areas of human rights practice
means that there is the possibility that one area of practice’s understand-
ing of the general justifying aim may conﬂict with that of another, and
this both encourages and facilitates the external critique of the approach
to human rights adopted in each area of practice.
This is highly relevant to the relationship between practice-dependent
and practice-independent approaches. Judges, for example, sometimes
need to draw on philosophical understandings of human rights, irre-
spective of whether these philosophers claim to be practice dependent
or practice independent. Given this, we should not be surprised to ﬁnd
that judges are likely to engage with practice-independent approaches,
including those approaches that would be considered to be ‘orthodox.’
To that extent, therefore, judicial practice can and does accommodate
insights from these philosophers, and, in doing so, the judicial practice
of human rights changes and adapts as new issues arise or old issues are
reconsidered. When practice-dependent philosophers then take judicial
practice seriously into account, as it is strongly suggested they should,
they will have to describe a practice that incorporates to some extent
practice-independent philosophers of human rights as well as practice-
dependent philosophers. Both will have become part of the practice of
human rights.
Thus far, I have suggested an approach that combines a weak general
justifying aim based in dignity, with a recognition that the pursuit of that
aim may involve the adoption of human rights in different institutional
forms, in different contexts, and with different content. This is vital for
understanding the normative pluralism of human rights practice,
because the pursuit of dignity through according human rights is neces-
sarily constrained by the normative understandings of each institution
and its institutional logic, set in particular contexts.
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Each area of practice will also have its own method of discourse. In
practice, what we see is that human rights arise out of contestation,
power struggles, and ideological conﬂict within and between these differ-
ent areas of practice. And some (indeed, many) of those conﬂicts con-
cern the very understanding of what it means to respect the human
worth of the person, and the role of the state in this understanding. Dis-
course, debate, and contestation are not marginal to the practice of
human rights, but central to it, and this contestation takes place as much
within particular areas of practice as between them.
Under my suggested approach, the lack of resolution of the contradic-
tions in the international adjudication of human rights law disputes, for
example, is not to be regarded as a failure but, rather, as an essential ele-
ment of the practice of human rights. The practice of human rights adju-
dication, human rights law, and human rights courts, becomes the site of
a provisional and (politically) temporary accommodation that helps us
to live together, despite the basic conﬂicts that are brought to court. We
agree to abide by the decisions of a decision maker whom we agree, for
the moment at least, is broadly legitimate and competent. Human rights
adjudication is seen as an enterprise in which the judge is not only
engaging with the dispute in hand, attempting to arrive at a justiﬁed and
reasoned judgment, but also doing so in a context in which the nature
of the judge’s resolution of the question is provisional.
My approach rejects the view that the pluralism existing at present in
human rights adjudication is chaotic in ways that are dysfunctional. My
approach accepts that human rights law, for example, is pluralistic but
argues that this pluralism is not randomly chaotic, or dysfunctional, or
temporary. From this perspective, international human rights law is seen
as providing a forum in which tensions and conﬂicts over some of the
most basic ethical, epistemological, and ontological questions are
engaged. From this perspective, it would be puzzling if a highly pluralis-
tic system of human rights had not emerged. The pluralism of the system
is not, therefore, a problem to be overcome but, rather, a critically
important and central aspect not only of the proper understanding of
human rights law but also of human rights tout court, one to be recog-
nized and cherished for the critical reﬂexive function it encourages.
My preferred approach is not, therefore, a static model but, instead,
one that is open to continuing change, including change involving the
continued suitability of international human rights law to provide the
forum in which these contested questions are considered at all. Not only
is the actual result in a particular case open to revision, but the judge’s
legitimacy in arriving at the decision at all is also provisional. That is an
important and defensible role for human rights law, and human rights
courts, but it is a modest one.
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III Conclusion
To conclude, this sketch (it is no more than that) of my alternative meta-
theory, arising out of a critique of Macklem’s stimulating book, chal-
lenges several aspects of recent philosophical discussions of human
rights, including Macklem’s own. Including the jurisprudence of human
rights in normative theories of human rights encourages a reformulation
of practice-based theories to include more attention to the evolution of
human rights at the national, as well as at the international, level. I sug-
gest that much more attention should be paid to dialogic and dialectic
processes that embrace sustained and reﬂexive contestation, pluralism,
judicial institutions, and social activism. I propose ways to develop a par-
tial détente between philosophical theories that are built on practice and
those that are not, in which the former also provides an account in
which principles drawn from ideal theories become incorporated into
human rights practice, which, in turn, must be taken account of by prac-
tice-dependent theories. Examining judicial approaches to the supposed
universal idea of dignity, ﬁnally, provides a more satisfactory explanation
of how human rights are conceived to be both dependent on the state
and to lie beyond it – to be part of international law and to lie beyond it.
An analysis of international human rights law must take this complexity
into account if a coherent and convincing explanation of the normativity
of international human rights law is to stand any chance of being identi-
ﬁed.
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